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UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCYv. 
MONTGOMERY: PAVING A NEW PATH TO 




In United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Montgomery, 1 a Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS)2 Tribunal found Olympic track and field gold medalist' and former world 
record holder4 Tim Montgomery (Montgomery) guilty of doping.5 The Tribunal 
• J.D. Candidate, 2007, University ofMaine School of Law. The author would like to thank his wife, 
Julie, for her boundless support in making the publication of this Note possible. 
I. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/0/645 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 13, 2005), 
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration Ruling: 
U.S. Track & Field Athlete Tim Montgomery Receives Suspension for Drug Violation" hyperlink under 
''2005") [hereinafter Montgomery, award on merits]. Montgomery was heard and decided concurrently 
with U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Gaines, which involved an American female sprinter, Chryste Gaines, 
who was also found to be guilty of doping by the CAS without ever testing positive for a banned substance. 
See CAS 2004/0/649 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/ 
management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration Ruling: U.S. Track & Field Athlete Chryste Gaines 
Receives Suspension for Drug Violation" hyperlink under "2005"). 
2. The CAS is based in Lausanne, Switzerland, but this case and its preliminary hearings were heard 
in San Francisco and Montreal by a three-member panel comprised ofL. Yves Fortier of Montreal, Canada, 
Christopher Campbell of San Francisco, United States, and Peter Leaver of London, United Kingdom. 
Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 8. 
3. Montgomery won a gold medal at the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, Australia as a member of Team 
USA's 4xl 00 meter relay. Tim Montgomery-Biography, http://www.usatf.org/athletes/bios/Montgomery _ 
Tim.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2006). 
4. Montgomery set a world record in the I 00 meter-dash by running 9. 78 seconds on the track in Paris 
in 2002. Id. 
5. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 24. Two attorneys for Montgomery, Robert 
W. McFarland and Amy Morrissey Turk, of the Norfolk, Virginia law firm McGuire Woods LLP, appealed 
the Tribunal's decision on January 21, 2006 through a letter. to the CAS Secretary-General Matthieu Reeb 
seeking to have it annulled on the grounds that one of the arbitrators had a conflict of interest. 
Montgomery's Attorneys Mull Court Action Over Conflict-of-Interest Claim, THE HERALD-SUN (Durham, 
N.C.), Jan. 21, 2006, at B3 [hereinafter Attorneys Mull Court Action]. Montgomery's lawyers allege that 
L. Yves Fortier's Montreal law firm, Ogilvy Renault, also represents the Montreal-based World Anti-
Doping Agency (WADA). Id. Specifically, it is alleged that the clerk working for the Tribunal, Stephen 
Drymer, Fortier's law firm partner, is the WAD A's attorney. Id. The letter called the alleged conflict of 
interest "egregious" and called into question the integrity and impartiality of the proceeding. Sprinter 
Appeals Ban, SPORT AL, Jan. 21, 2006, http://loudytourky.sportal.com.au/othersports.asp?i=news&id=76685 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2006). Secretary-General Reeb rejected the appeal, saying it was wrongly directed 
to the CAS. Id. Reeb said Switzerland's highest court, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, is the only body with 
jurisdiction to consider a CAS decision. Id. Montgomery's attorneys indicated that Montgomery is 
considering such an appeal to Switzerland's highest court, as well as one to the United States Federal 
Courts. Id If the Tribunal's ruling was overturned, the CAS could opt to try Montgomery again. Attorneys 
Mull Court Action, supra. The appeal of the CAS Tribunal's decision, however, appears to have taken a 
back seat for Montgomery and his attorneys to more pressing legal problems for the former Olympic 
champion. Ovidiu Panzariu, Montgomery Says NO to Fraud Accusations, SOFTPEDIA NEWS, May 4, 2006, 
http://news.softpedia.com/news/Montgomery-Says-NO-to-Fraud-Accusations-22756.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2006). In April 2006, Montgomery was arrested on charges that he had participated in a 
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determined, after considering the evidence presented by the United States Anti-Doping 
Agency (USADA), that Montgomery had taken THG,6 a prohibited performance-
enhancing drug known in colloquial parlance as "the Clear." 7 As punishment, 
Montgomery was banned from competition for two years, stripped of his on-track 
achievements dating back to March 200 l, and ordered to repay an estimated $1 million 
in earnings. 8 
Montgomery is an extraordinary case because Montgomery was found guilty of 
using THG without ever testing positive for the drug in an in-competition or out-of-
competition drug test. 9 Thus, the Tribunal's finding dramatically altered the landscape 
for Olympic athletes who face charges that they took a banned performance-enhancing 
substance. Historically, the bright line evidentiary rule has required an Olympic athlete 
to test positive for a banned substance in an officially administered drug test before he 
or she could be found guilty of doping. The Montgomery decision eradicated this rule 
and established that an athlete could be found guilty of doping without evidence of a 
positive drug test. 
In rendering its verdict, the Montgomery Tribunal relied heavily upon United 
States Anti-Doping Agency v. Collins, 10 a December 2004 decision by a North 
American Court of Arbitration for Sport (NAS) Panel. Collins was the only previous 
instance in which an athlete charged with doping by the US ADA had been found guilty 
without evidence of a positive drug test, known in Olympic circles as an "analytical 
positive." 11 The CAS is the "Supreme Court" of Olympic issues and the NAS is a 
lower court subject to CAS review; 12 therefore, the Collins Panel's landmark decision 
did not carry precedential weight worldwide until the Montgomery Tribunal reiterated 
its holding. 13 Now that a CAS Tribunal has provided its stamp of approval to the idea 
multimillion-dollar bank fraud and money-laundering scheme that also involved his coach Steven Riddick. 
Ex-World's Fastest Man Busted in Fraud, CBS NEWS, Apr. 28, 2006, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/28/sportsline/main 1560120.shtml [hereinafter Busted in Fraud] 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2006). Montgomery pleaded "not guilty" to the charges before a federal court in 
Manhattan, New York. Panzariu, supra. Specifically, prosecutors have charged that Montgomery was paid 
$20,000 for depositing nearly $1 million in bogus checks. Busted in Fraud, supra. 
6. THG or''the Clear" is a designer steroid that was undetectable in anti-doping tests until 2003, when 
a track and field coach provided a sample to the USADA. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 
2004/0/645, at I. The steroid was created and distributed to athletes in various sports by San Francisco-
based BALCO. Id. 
1. Id. 
8. Id.; see also Montgomery Retires in Wake of 2-year Doping Ban, ABC NEWS, Dec. 14, 2005, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/ESPNSports/story?id= 1407042 [hereinafter Montgomery Retires] (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2006). 
9. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at I. 
10. AAA No. 301900065804 (N. Am. Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Former World Champion Collins 
Receives Eight-Year Suspension for Participation in BALCO Drug Conspiracy" hyperlink under "2004"). 
11. Id. at I. Michelle Collins, a gold medalist in the 200-meter dash at the 2003 World Indoor Track 
and Field Championship, was suspended for eight years by the NAS after being found guilty of doping. 
Id. at 7, 29. 
12. For an overview of Olympic doping adjudication, see infra Table I. 
13. AMERICAN ARBITRATION AsSOCIA TION SUPPLEMENT ARY PROCEDURES FOR THE ARBITRATION OF 
OLYMPIC SPORT DOPING DISPUTES R-49A (2004), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28627. The 
pertinent language that allows for appeal of a ruling by the NAS to the CAS is: 
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that an Olympic athlete can be found guilty of doping without testing positive for a 
banned substance, a new path to conviction has been paved for Olympic prosecuting 
agencies like the USADA. The question now becomes: Was Montgomery decided 
correctly? Also, how will it alter the legal landscape and affect future Olympic doping 
cases? 
This Note explains how the CAS and the USADA emerged to become prominent 
players in the world of Olympic dopingjurisprudence. Furthermore, this Note explores 
the determination made by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) that CAS 
Olympic doping hearings should be regarded as quasi-criminal with a burden of proof 
that lies somewhere between the civil and criminal standard. 14 Specifically, the 
WADA adopted a "comfortable satisfaction of the relevant hearing body" standard in 
the World Anti-Doping Code (W ADC), a prosecutorial burden described as "greater 
than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 15 
Finally, this Note analyzes the Montgomery decision by examining the approach used 
by the CAS Tribunal to determine whether Montgomery was afforded sufficient due 
process before being found guilty of doping. The case will no doubt carry enormous 
precedential weight; thus, the right to a fair hearing for future Olympic athletes accused 
of doping in "non-analytical positive" cases is also at stake. 
Ultimately, this Note does not support the Tribunal's decision in Montgomery 
because it wrongly characterized the proceeding as civil instead of quasi-criminal. 
This error led to a series of missteps that resulted in Montgomery being unfairly 
penalized because he was not accorded a fair hearing. First, the Tribunal failed to 
settle on an applicable burden of proof, deciding that it did not matter whether a quasi-
criminal or criminal standard was used because, in the Tribunal's words, there is no 
"great gulfbetween proofin civil and criminal matters." 16 Next, the Tribunal deemed 
it appropriate to regard Montgomery's alleged confession alone as sufficient proof of 
his guilt, something that should never happen in either a criminal or quasi-criminal 
proceeding. The determination, wholly without precedent, defied the approach taken 
in Collins, in which the Panel required the USADA to present a myriad of 
corroborating evidence before finding Collins guilty of doping. 17 Finally, the Tribunal 
wrongly drew an adverse inference from Montgomery's decision not to testify. This 
conclusion compounded the error made in Collins, where the Panel determined that it 
was proper to draw an adverse inference from an American athlete's decision to invoke 
the Fifth Amendment and not testify. In sum, the Tribunal's finding in Montgomery 
The arbitration award may be appealed to [the] CAS as provided in Annex A of the USADA 
Protocol .... Appeals to [the] CAS filed under these rules shall be heard in the United 
States. The decisions of[the] CAS shall be final and binding on all parties and shall not be 
subject to any further review or appeal .... 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
14. WORLD ANTI-DoPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE 12 (2003), available at 
http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_ v3.pdf [hereinafter WADA ANTI-DoPING CODE]. 
15. Id. 
16. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 13 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 13, 2005), 
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration Ruling: 
U.S. Track & Field Athlete Tim Montgomery Receives Suspension for Drug Violation" hyperlink under 
"2005"). 
17. See Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at 25. 
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was incorrect because Montgomery was not afforded the due process appropriate to 
a quasi-criminal proceeding. 
In the haste to clean up Olympic sports and combat the perception that many 
athletes competing are "dirty," the CAS must carefully consider how the reasoning that 
led to a guilty verdict in the Montgomery case could lead to the unjust conviction of 
athletes in future non-analytical positive cases. The CAS must establish proper 
procedural safeguards for this kind of Olympic doping proceeding. In Montgomery, 
the Tribunal failed to establish the right blueprint. 
This Note proposes that future CAS Tribunals reconsider the stances the 
Montgomery Tribunal adopted that permit an adverse inference to be drawn from an 
athlete's decision not to testify, and allow an athlete to be convicted solely on evidence 
of an alleged confession. Olympic doping proceedings should not be viewed as private 
civil arbitrations, but rather as private quasi-criminal arbitrations, which afford athletes 
safeguards that are somewhat analogous to criminal trials. In short, the CAS should 
adopt standards that will cause its Olympic doping hearings to more closely resemble 
criminal proceedings than civil ones. A "conviction" in such a setting, while not 
"criminal" in the literal sense of the word, essentially amounts to one in the world of 
Olympic sports, and before athletes are labeled "dopers" they should be accorded 
proper due process. 
At stake is the credibility of the still fledgling CAS. The world watches, 
wondering: can the CAS emerge as a global body with true worldwide respect apt to 
handle Olympic doping cases with an avowed air of neutrality? If the CAS is seen as 
nothing more than a shill for prosecuting agencies like the USADA, the current system 
of Olympic doping jurisprudence is doomed to fail. 
II. THE ROAD TO UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY V. MONTGOMERY 
A. The CAS is Created to Bring Uniformity to Olympic Jurisprudence 
The CAS was established in 1983 at a time when much of the jurisprudence 
surrounding the Olympic movement was uncertain and inconsistent. 18 In founding the 
CAS, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) hoped to fill a much-needed 
jurisdictional void in international sports by creating an "ultimate, authoritative and 
neutral solution to judicial disputes" that would bring uniformity to the Olympic 
arena. 19 In the more than two decades since the CAS was established, however, it has 
struggled to become the "Supreme Court" of Olympic sports that the IOC envisioned. 
The development of the CAS into a true worldwide, impartial purveyor of justice 
has been stunted chiefly for two reasons. First, international governing bodies like the 
International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), which oversees track and field, 
have been reluctant to surrender the jurisdiction they have historically enjoyed over 
18. Cf Richard H. McLaren, Sports Law Arbitration by CAS: Is it the Same as International 
Arbitration?, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 101, JOI (2001) (discussing the emergence of the CAS and comparing it 
favorably to other bodies that conduct international arbitrations). 
19. Id. 
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matters involving their athletes.20 Second, the CAS has been hampered by a perception 
that it is too closely connected to the IOC, the WADA, and the international governing 
bodies. 21 While the CAS has made great strides toward overcoming the first hurdle by 
wrestling jurisdiction away from the international governing bodies, the CAS is still 
struggling to shake the doubts many have about its ability to be neutral. 22 Athletes and 
their lawyers continue to openly question the objectivity of CAS (and NAS) 
arbitrators. 23 
B. The IAAF Hands the CAS its Jurisdictional Reigns 
In August 200 I, the IAAF surrendered jurisdiction over issues arising in the track 
and field arena to the CAS.24 The transfer of power gave the CAS and its arbitrators 
authority to hear doping cases that involved track and field athletes worldwide.25 At 
roughly the same time, in 1999 and 2000, respectively, the WADA and the USADA 
were established to create and enforce a uniform doping code to be used in CAS and 
NAS hearings. 26 The World Anti-Doping Code (W ADC), written by the WADA, was 
unveiled in 2004, ensuring "for the first time, the rules and regulations governing anti-
doping are the same across all sports ... :m Each governing body, like the IAAF, 
adopted the W ADC in its doping proceedings before the CAS to create uniformity 
20. The IAAF created an arbitration panel in 1982 to handle doping cases internally and remained the 
final and binding authority over cases involving track and field athletes for nearly two decades. Id. at I 02. 
21. Cf Michael S. Straube), Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in 
International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523,541 (2002) (describing the CAS prior to 1993, a period when 
it was funded entirely by the IOC and was based in the IOC's headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland). 
22. Brendan I. Koerner, Where Do Athletes Go to Court? Why, to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 
of Course, SLATE, July I, 2004, http://www.slate.com/Default.aspx?id=2l03285 (last visited Sept. 29, 
2006). Specifically, Koerner writes: 
Id. 
Though the CAS has been ostensibly independent of the IOC since 1994, there are some 
athletes who grumble that the court is too biased in favor of the Olympics' management. 
They point out that many members of the ICAS [International Council of Arbitration for 
Sport], who select the [CAS) arbitrators, are members of either the IOC or the Association 
of National Olympic Committees. 
In an effort to make it a truly independent body, the CAS underwent a major reform in 1994 after the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal opined that it was too closely tied to the IOC. Matthieu Reeb, The Court of 
Arbitration for Sport, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/histoire/histoireA.htrn (last visited Sept. 29, 2006). 
Control of the CAS was transferred from the IOC to the newly created, more independent, ICAS. Id. Frank 
Shorter, Chairman of the USADA from 2000-2003 and a gold (1972) and silver (1976) Olympic medalist 
in the men's marathon, holds a contrary view when it comes to the independence of the current pool ofNAS 
and CAS arbitrators. Frank Shorter, Op-Ed, Maintaining Standards is Role of Anti-Doping Agency, S.F. 
CHRON., July 30, 2004, at B9. Shorter writes, "[t]he hearing is before an independent panel that is selected 
from an independent pool of people from North America. It is intentionally set up so that these arbitrators 
have no connections with [the] USADA, except a willingness to give their time, effort and expertise." Id. 
23. See, e.g., Koerner, supra note 22. 
24. Straube), supra note 21, at 560. 
25. See id. 
26. Richard W. Pound, Chairman of the World Anti-Doping Agency, Chairman's Message, 
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=237 (last visited Sept. 29, 2006); Straube), 
supra note 21, at 559 (referring to the "birth" of the USADA on October I, 2000). 
27. Id. 
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across the spectrum of Olympic sports. The American governing bodies, like USA 
Track and Field (USATF), directed by the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), 
adopted the W ADC and empowered the USADA to become its prosecutorial arm in 
doping cases before the CAS and the NAS. 28 
As a consequence, the burden of proof was lowered in doping proceedings that 
implicated track and field athletes.29 The IAAF (and USATF) had previously 
maintained a criminal burden of proof in doping hearings, but after the implementation 
of the W ADC prosecuting agencies, like the USADA, had to meet only a quasi-
criminal burden to convince a CAS Tribunal that an athlete was guilty of doping.30 
The WADA concluded that a quasi-criminal burden of proof was appropriate after 
determining that criminal procedural guarantees were not necessary for doping disputes 
taking place before a private sports governing body.31 NAS and CAS Tribunals would 
thus have to be convinced by prosecuting agencies like the USADA only to their 
"comfortable satisfaction" that a track and field athlete had taken a banned 
performance-enhancing substance. 32 
C. Quasi-Criminal Standards Are Established for Olympic Doping Cases 
The WADA based this determination upon the position taken by Switzerland's 
highest court, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, as it reviewed a series ofCAS decisions in 
the 1990s. 33 The Swiss Federal Tribunal maintains a unique position of authority in 
Olympic jurisprudence as the only court with the power to review a CAS decision.34 
The position, adopted by the WADA, is that the "procedural guarantees that 
international (and national) human rights instruments afford in criminal matters" are 
not applicable to cases that involve doping sanctions, because such hearings are 
"private rather than criminal in nature." 35 The WADA accordingly deemed a burden 
28. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/0/645, at 2 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Feb. 9, 
2005), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration 
Ruling: CAS Award on Jurisdiction in Chryste Gaines & Tim Montgomery Proceedings" hyperlink under 
"2005") [hereinafter Montgomery, award on jurisdiction). See generally Straubel,supra note 21, at 558-62. 
29. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 12 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 13, 2005), 
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration Ruling: 
U.S. Track & Field Athlete Tim Montgomery Receives Suspension for Drug Violation" hyperlink under 
"2005"). 
30. Id. 
31. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, LEGAL OPINION ON THE CONFORMITY OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF 
THE DRAFT WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE WITH COMMONLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
19-20 (2003), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/kaufmann-kohler-full.pdf 
[hereinafter WADA LEGAL OPINION]. 
32. WADA ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 14, at 12. 
33. WADA LEGAL OPINION, supra note 31, at 19-20. 
34. Id. at 19-20. See Tribunal federal suisse [Federal Tribunal] Mar. 15, 1993, 119 Arrets du Tribunal 
Federal Suisse [Official Digest of Federal Tribunal Judgments] 271 (Switz.) (holding that sanctions by 
sports federations are private rather than criminal in nature, and that such private law matters cannot be 
resolved "in the light of notions proper to criminal law"). The Gunde/ case effectively allowed the CAS 
to become a worldwide player, because Switzerland's highest court formally recognized the legitimacy of 
its decisions. See Stephen A. Kaufman, Note, Issues in International Sports Arbitration, 13 B.U. INT'LL.J. 
527, 541-42 (1995). 
35. Id. at 19. 
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of proof that "is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt" most appropriate for CAS doping hearings. 36 
A leading scholar on the CAS, Professor Michael Straubel,37 opines that the 
unstated rationale behind this decision was a desire to combat the image that athletes 
taking performance-enhancing drugs were hijacking the Olympic movement.38 
Straube( points to a series of doping scandals that threatened to taint the public's 
impression of Olympic sports and seriously curtail Olympic sponsorship money in the 
late 1990s.39 Most notable among these was the indignity of the 1998 Tour de France, 
when several cyclists tested positive for banned substances. 40 Straube( cautions that 
athletes accused of doping must be accorded fair hearings for the CAS to demonstrate 
that it is indeed a neutral third party uninfluenced by the Olympic establishment.41 
Straube! has suggested that the burden of proof in doping cases "should be more 
like that used in criminal cases."42 The CAS needs to clearly define, writes Straube(, 
precisely where the comfortable satisfaction standard falls between the criminal and 
civil standards of proof.43 The question remains, writes Straube!, "[i]s proof to a 
comfortable satisfaction closer to proof beyond a reasonable doubt because doping 
cases are at the least quasi-criminal in nature? Or, is proof to a comfortable 
satisfaction closer to the preponderance of the evidence standard because doping cases 
are private in nature?'..w 
D. The USADA Emerges as the Prosecuting Arm of the USOC 
The USADA has not lost a single case since it began prosecuting American 
Olympic athletes for alleged doping violations in 2002.45 Until December 2004, and 
36. WADAANTI-OOPINGCODE,supranote 14,at 12. 
37. Michael S. Straube) is an Associate Professor at Valparaiso University School of Law and 
Valparaiso's Head Cross Country and Assistant Track Coach. In addition, Straubel is the Director of the 
Sports Law Clinic at Valparaiso that provides free legal help to athletes, coaches, and others involved in 
amateur sports. The clinic is currently representing Olympic and amateur athletes in cases involving 
doping, eligibility, and immigration issues. See http://www.valpo.edu/law/sportsclinic/legalclinic.html (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2006). 
38. Straube), supra note 21, at 555. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 525-26. 
42. Michael S. Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of Arbitra-
tion for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1272 (2005). 
43. Id. at 1268-69. 
44. Id. Legal scholars believe that the Australian Supreme Court, searching for the appropriate standard 
to be used in a divorce proceeding, may have been the first to utilize the "comfortable satisfaction" standard 
of proof. Id. at 1266-67. Interestingly, the Australian courts have deemed it inappropriate to use the 
comfortable satisfaction standard in criminal or quasi-criminal cases, perhaps a signal that it is not the 
proper standard to be used in doping cases. Id. at 1267. 
45. Telephone Interview with Michael S. Straube!, Associate Professor, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law 
and Head Cross Country Coach and Assistant Track Coach, Valparaiso Univ., in Valparaiso, Ind. (Mar. I 0, 
2006). See generally http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (listing all of the 
arbitration rulings involving the USADA as prosecuting authority since 2002). The USADA's authority 
to prosecute athletes and compel them to submit to mandatory binding arbitration comes from the USOC 
and its bylaws. See Montgomery, award on jurisdiction, CAS 2004/0/645, at 6 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Feb. 
9, 2005), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 157 2007
2007] OLYMPIC DOPING CASES 157 
the finding by an NAS Panel that Michelle Collins was guilty of doping in a "non-
analytical positive" case, each of the USADA's victories followed the traditional 
script. 46 An athlete would test positive for a banned substance in an in-competition or 
out-of-competition drug test, and be charged by the USADA with a doping violation. 
The athlete would then be tried before an NAS or CAS Tribunal who, after considering 
evidence of the positive drug test, would invariably find the athlete guilty as charged. 
These cases presented straightforward evidentiary issues for Tribunals because an 
analytical positive, under the strict liability standard followed by the NAS and the 
CAS, would alone provide sufficient evidence of the athlete's guilt. 47 The NAS has, 
in fact, established that the USADA "need only show the presence of a prohibited 
substance in an athlete's sample to prove a doping offense." 48 
The case against Michelle Collins marked an aggressive new chapter in the 
USADA's pursuit of prohibited drug use by American Olympic athletes. In Collins, 
the USADA sought for the first time to sanction an athlete who had never tested 
positive for a banned substance in an in-competition or out-of-competition drug test.49 
Thus, the NAS Tribunal that heard Collins was presented with a landmark evidentiary 
question: how could the USADA demonstrate there was sufficient evidence to prove 
its case without evidence of a positive drug test? In its opinion, the three-member 
panel acknowledged the ground breaking nature of the case when it wrote, the 
"USADA seeks for the first time to sanction an athlete [Michelle Collins] who has not 
tested positive in any of her in-competition or out-of-competition drug tests. Thus ... 
Ruling: CAS Award on Jurisdiction in Chryste Gaines & Tim Montgomery Proceedings" hyperlink under 
"2005"). The USOC has jurisdiction over all American Olympic athletes through the Amateur Sports Act 
(ASA), passed by Congress in 1978. See Melissa R. Bitting, Comment, Mandatory Binding Arbitration 
For Olympic Athletes: ls the Process Better Or Worse For "Job Security"?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 655, 
657, 672 ( 1998) ( critiquing the mandatory arbitration process, and calling on the CAS to "protect the rights 
of the athletes and to address the need for fair and efficient resolution of disputes."). In the ASA, Congress 
gave the USOC "exclusive jurisdiction ... over all matters pertaining to the participation of the United 
States in the Olympic Games." Id. at 657. A clause in the contract that athletes sign to represent the United 
States in Olympic competitions compels them to submit to mandatory binding arbitration before either the 
NAS or the CAS. Montgomery, award on jurisdiction, CAS 2004/0/645, at 6. This clause, which keeps 
doping cases out of the federal courts, was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Slaney v. International Amateur Athletic Federation. 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001). In Slaney, 
the court held that "Slaney participated in a valid arbitration ... [that] we are obligated to recognize. Thus, _ 
the issue decided in that arbitration cannot be relitigated .... [T]he district court correctly determined that 
it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. at 601;seealso Jacobs v. USA Track and Field, 374 F.3d 85 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (reiterating the USADA's authority by finding that the USADA's rules were valid in doping 
cases brought before the NAS and by upholding the district court's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction). See 
generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2005) (giving the federal courts the power to uphold all 
valid arbitrations that the two sides agree to submit to in advance). 
46. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at I (N. Am. Ct. of Arb. for Sport 
Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow 
"Former World Champion Collins Receives Eight-Year Suspension for Participation in BALCO Drug 
Conspiracy'' hyperlink under "2004"). 
4 7. The CAS has adopted a "pure strict liability" standard for cases that involve a positive drug test. 
Straube!, supra note 42, at 1262. Under this standard, "any question of fault, intent, or negligence is 
irrelevant: an athlete may not avoid a sanction by showing an absence of fault." Id. 
48. Id. at 1265. 
49. Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at I. 
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the case involves issues that have not previously had to be decided by Arbitral 
Tribunals." 50 The Panel, however, did not regard the novel nature of the proceeding 
as a bar to conviction, finding that "the straightforward application oflegal principles" 
led to a clear resolution of the matter.51 
The Panel applied the criminal standard of proof when considering the evidence 
presented by the USADA because Collins's alleged doping offenses occurred prior to 
the IAAF's adoption of the WADC's quasi-criminal standard. 52 The burden of proof 
rested with the USADA to "show that Collins intentionally used a prohibited substance 
or technique." 53 The Panel determined that the USADA had met its burden of proof 
by presenting a variety of convincing evidence. 54 This evidence included: (I) email 
exchanges between Collins and Victor Conte, President of the San Francisco-based 
Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO), which specifically mentioned her use of 
banned substances; (2) documents seized from BALCO labeled "Michelle Collins" that 
contained shorthand for the banned substances THG and EPO; (3) expert testimony of 
the USADA doctors whose analysis ofCollins's blood and urine test results led the 
doctors to the conclusion that she was doping; and (4) testimony by Kelli White that 
Conte told her directly, among other things, that Collins was using EPO and THG.55 
By basing its finding of guilt on a substantial amount of corroborating evidence, the 
Collins Panel established the proper blueprint for this new "non-analytical positive" 
category of cases. 
Seemingly aware of the precedential nature of the opinion it was crafting, the 
Collins Panel addressed one other key procedural issue: was it proper to draw an 
adverse inference from an athlete's decision not to testify? 56 The Panel determined that 
it was indeed proper for a Tribunal to "draw certain adverse inferences" against an 
American athlete who invokes the Fifth Amendment because Olympic doping 
proceedings are "civil" in nature. 57 This conclusion was based primarily upon the 
Tribunal's interpretation of Baxter v. Pa/migiano, 58 where the United States Supreme 
Court held that the "Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against 
parties in civil actions ... . "59 
The Collins Panel failed to note, however, that the Baxter holding also established 
that an adverse inference could not be drawn in a criminal case, where the judge and 
prosecutor were prohibited from suggesting that the defendant's silence was 
tantamount to evidence of guilt. 60 Skirting this part of the Baxter holding, the Collins 
Panel found that an adverse inference could be drawn against an American athlete 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 11-12. 
53. Id. at 12. 
54. Id. at 25. 
55. Id. at 25-27. 
56. Id. at 14. 
51. Id. 
58. 425 U.S. 308 (1976). 
59. Id. at 318 (allowing an adverse inference to be drawn in civil actions when a witness refuses "to 
testify in response to probative evidence offered against them"); see Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at 
14-15; see also Sanders v. Gardner, 7 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)(allowing an arbitral panel 
to draw an adverse inference from a witness's refusal to testify). 
60. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. at 318-19. 
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because doping proceedings were "civil arbitrations." 61 This characterization, how-
ever, would appear to be at odds with both the criminal burden of proofused in Collins 
and the W ADA's determination that doping cases should be regarded as quasi-
criminal, with a burden of proof that is "greater than a mere balance of probability. "62 
Buoyed by the outcome in Collins, the USADA next sought to prosecute Tim 
Montgomery for alleged doping violations in the highest profile "non-analytical 
positive" case yet. Montgomery would become arguably the most visible name in 
track and field to be labeled a "doper" since Ben Johnson was stripped of a gold medal 
and world record in the 100-meter dash at the 1988 Olympics. 63 The key difference 
is that Johnson tested positive for a banned substance in an in-competition drug test, 
while Montgomery never tested positive for a banned substance in an in-competition 
or out-of-competition drug test. 
III. THE UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY V. MONTGOMERY DECISION 
In Montgomery, the USADA informed Tim Montgomery through a June 7, 2004 
letter that it had received evidence indicating his participation "in a doping conspiracy 
involving various elite athletes and coaches as well as BALCO." 64 In a follow-up 
letter, the USADA told Montgomery that it was formally charging him with violations 
of track and field's anti-doping rules: "[The] USADA charges that your participation 
in the [BALCO] conspiracy, the purpose of which was to trade in doping substances 
and techniques that were either undetectable or difficult to detect in routine testing, 
involved your violations of ... IAAF Rules that strictly forbid doping. "65 Specifically, 
61. Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at 14. 
62. WADA ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 14, at 12. 
63. Frank Litsky, Montgomery is Suspended 2 Years for Steroid Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at 
D3. Ben Johnson was stripped ofan Olympic gold medal at the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, South Korea after 
dashing to a world record time of 9. 79 seconds in the I 00 meter-dash. Id. Johnson tested positive for the 
anabolic steroid, stanozolol, in the post-race drug test. Id. 
64. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 4 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 13, 2005), 
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration Ruling: 
U.S. Track & Field Athlete Tim Montgomery Receives Suspension for Drug Violation" hyperlink under 
"2005"). 
65. Id at 5. Montgomery was accused of violating the following IAAF rules: 
Rule 55.2-The offen[s]e of doping takes place when either: (i) a prohibited substance is 
present within an athlete's body tissues or fluids; or (ii) an athlete uses or takes advantage 
of a prohibited technique; or (iii) an athlete admits having used or taken advantage of a 
prohibited substance or a prohibited technique .... 
Rule 56.3-Any person assisting or inciting others, or admitting having incited or assisted 
others, to use a prohibited substance, or prohibited techniques, shall have committed a 
doping offen[s]e and shall be subject to sanctions in accordance with Rule 60 .... 
Rule 56. 4-Any person trading, trafficking, distributing or selling any prohibited substance 
otherwise than in the normal course of a recogni[z]ed profession or trade shall also have 
committed a doping offen[s]e under these Rules and shall be subject to sanctions in 
accordance with Rule 60. 
Rule 60.J-For the purpose of these Rules, the following shall be regarded as "doping 
offen[s]es" ... (i) the presence in an athlete's body tissues or fluids of a prohibited 
substance; (ii) the use or taking advantage of forbidden techniques; (iii) admitting having 
taken advantage of, or having used, or having attempted to use, a prohibited substance or 
a prohibited technique .... 
Id at 5-6. 
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Montgomery was told that the evidence confirmed his use of Anabolic Steroids, 
Testosterone/Epitestosterone Cream, EPO, Growth Hormone, and Insulin.66 
The USADA initially told Montgomery that, as punishment, it would seek to 
sanction him with a lifetime ban from competition. 67 The agency, however, would later 
lower its proposed sanction to a four-year period ofineligibility. 68 The USADA also 
sought to retroactively expunge his on-track achievements dating back to February 
2000,69 and recoup the money he had earned during the same period. 70 
In response to the charges levied against him, Montgomery notified the USADA 
on June 28, 2004 that he would elect to bypass the NAS and proceed directly to the 
CAS for a final, binding, non-appealable hearing pursuant to his rights under USA TF 
rules.71 The USADA then submitted its request for arbitration to the CAS on July 5, 
2004, identifying Peter Leaver, barrister of London, England, as its party-appointed 
arbitrator. 72 Montgomery submitted his answer to the USADA 's arbitration request the 
next day, providing a brief statement ofhis defense and naming San Francisco attorney 
Christopher Campbell as his party-appointed arbitrator. 73 The two party-appointed 
arbitrators then chose L. Yves Fortier, barrister of Montreal, Canada, to serve as 
President of the Arbitral Tribunal. 74 
Three preliminary hearings were held prior to the final hearing on the merits. 75 
First, on November I, 2004, the Tribunal convened with the parties to establish a 
timetable which called for a second preliminary hearing to be held in Montreal on 
December 15, 2004, to resolve the question of whether the CAS hadjurisdiction. 76 At 
the second hearing, Montgomery submitted a motion to dismiss that contended the 
CAS lacked jurisdiction and argued the USADA lacked authority to bring the case. 77 
Montgomery argued that only USATF, as the agency that governed track and field in 
66. Id. at 6. 
67. Id. For an Olympian like Montgomery, a four-year ban is tantamount to a lifetime ban. The 
USADA was essentially seeking to end Montgomery's career. 
68. Id. at n.7. 
69. Below are some of Montgomery's on-track achievements since February 2000 that the USADA 
sought to retroactively cancel: (I) Montgomery's gold medal performance at the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, 
Australia as a member of Team USA's 4x!0O meter relay; (2) a gold medal earned as the anchor leg for 
Team USA's 4xl00 meter relay at the 2001 World Outdoor Championships; (3) silver medals won in the 
100 meter-dash at the 2001 World Outdoor Championships (where he ran 9.85 seconds) and the 60 meter-
dash at the World Indoor Championships (where he ran 6.46 seconds); (4) his world record setting run of 
9. 78 seconds in the I 00 meter-dash at the 2002 lAAF Grand Prix Final in Paris and subsequent ranking as 
the world's top sprinter for 2002 by Track & Field News; and (5) his overall 2002 Grand Prix title. Tim 
Montgomery-Biography, http://www.usatf.org/athletes/bios/Montgomery_ Tim.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 
2006). 
70. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 6. Montgomery commanded an average of 
$40,000 to appear at a meet after setting the world record in 2002. Montgomery Retires, supra note 8. 
lAAF rules allow for subsidiary governing bodies, like USA TF, to seek the repayment of appearance and 
prize money from athletes banned for doping violations. Id. 




75. Id. at 10-11. 
76. Id. at 11. 
77. Id. 
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the United States, could charge him with a doping offense in a case where there was 
no evidence of a positive drug test.78 The Tribunal dismissed Montgomery's motion, 
affirming both the CAS 's jurisdiction over the matter and the power of the USADA to 
charge an athlete in a "non-analytical positive" case. 79 The three-member panel 
determined that "[the USADA's] responsibility extends beyond 'drug testing' and 
covers all cases of alleged doping violations. It possessed, and possesses, full authority 
to prosecute these cases. "80 
A final preliminary hearing was held before the Tribunal in Montreal on February 
21, 2005, to address the question of the applicable burden ofproof. 81 Montgomery 
argued that it should be the IAAF's long standing criminal standard, while the USADA 
argued that it should be the IAAF's newly adopted quasi-criminal standard.82 The 
disagreement stemmed from the IAAF's March 2004 decision to lower its burden of 
proof in doping cases against track and field athletes by adopting the W ADC's 
"comfortable satisfaction" standard. 83 In the end, the Tribunal sidestepped the issue 
by holding that "the debate [ over differing standards of proof] looms larger in theory 
than practice[,]" reasoning: 
[T]here [is not] necessarily a great gulf between proof in civil and criminal matters . 
. . . It makes little, if indeed any, difference whether a "beyond [a] reasonable doubt" 
or "comfortable satisfaction" standard is applied .... Either way, USADA bears the 
burden of proving, by strong evidence commensurate with the serious claims it 
makes, that [Montgomery] committed the doping offen[s]es in question. 84 
The Tribunal heard the merits in San Francisco from June 6th to 10th 2005.85 
Both parties made oral arguments to the three-member panel and presented evidence 
through witness testimony.86 
As the prosecuting agency, the USADA argued that Montgomery was guilty of the 
alleged doping offenses by presenting seven types of evidence: (l) February 2000 
blood test results analyzed in a Mexican lab that allegedly showed Montgomery's 
testosterone level had doubled over the course of one day; (2) BALCO documents 
seized by the government; (3) test results reported by IOC-accredited and BALCO 
laboratories showing evidence of steroids in Montgomery's urine on fifty-six occasions 
between March 1999 and September 2004; ( 4) allegedly abnormal blood tests on five 
occasions between November 2000 and July 2001; (5) Montgomery's alleged 
admission to fellow American track athlete Kelli White that he had "used a prohibited 
substance known colloquially as 'the Clear"'; (6) statements made by BALCO 
78. Montgomery, award on jurisdiction, CAS 2004/0/645, at 5 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Feb. 9, 2005), 
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration Ruling: 
CAS Award on Jurisdiction in Chryste Gaines & Tim Montgomery Proceedings" hyperlink under "2005"). 
19. Id. at 9. 
80. Id. 
81. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 11-12. 
82. Id. at 12-13. 
83. Id. at 12; see also WADA ANTI-DoPING CODE, supra note 14, at 12-13 (outlining the burdens and 
standards of proof for Olympic sport doping cases under the W ADC). 
84. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 13-14. 
85. Id. at 14. 
86. Id 
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President Victor Conte to investigative authorities and the media that alluded to 
Montgomery's involvement in the BALCO drug scandal; and (7) San Francisco 
Chronicle stories reporting that Montgomery had admitted to using various prohibited 
substances when he appeared before-a grandjury. 87 
In response, Montgomery argued that the evidence presented by the USADA was 
unreliable and untruthful. 88 Specifically, Montgomery challenged the statements made 
by Victor Conte and Kelli White, and the results of the blood and urine tests analyzed 
by non-IOC labs.89 
In the end, the Tribunal deemed it unnecessary to determine the veracity of each 
type of evidence presented because it found that Montgomery's alleged confession to 
Kelli White alone was sufficiently compelling to find him guilty of doping.90 The 
Tribunal reasoned that "[d]oping offen[s]es can be proved by a variety of means; and 
this is nowhere more true than in 'non-analytical positive' cases such as the present."91 
The Tribunal, apparently applying a criminal and quasi-criminal burden of proof 
concurrently to the evidence reasoned it "ha[d] no doubt in this case, and [was] more 
than comfortably satisfied that Mr. Montgomery committed the doping offen[s]e in 
question." 92 
The Tribunal found White's testimony so compelling because she had previously 
admitted to doping herself and willingly accepted a two-year ban from competition.93 
The Tribunal believed White to be "honest," "intelligent," "dispassionate," and 
''wholly credible. "94 For the Tribunal, the critical component ofWhite's testimony was 
87. Id. at 16-17. The USADA dropped all charges against Montgomery during the course of the 
proceeding except for the allegation that he had violated lAAF Rule 55.2, which allows for sanctions to be 
brought against an athlete who admits to having used a prohibited substance. The USADA focused its case 
on this charge aftr.r it became apparent that it would be futile to attempt to prove that Montgomery had 
violated the lAAF Rules that prohibit an athlete from "assisting or inciting" and "trafficking" in banned 
substances. Id. at 16. 
88. Id. at 17. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. The Montgomery Tribunal noted that this decision should in no way be interpreted to mean that 
the rest of the evidence presented by the USADA was not credible. The Panel stated, "the fact that [we do] 
not consider it necessary in the circumstances to analy[z]e and comment on the mass of other evidence 
against the Athlete, however, is not to be taken as an indication that it considers that such other evidence 
could not demonstrate that the Respondent is guilty of doping." Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 20. 
93. Id. at 17. 
94. Id. at 17-18. Kelli White voluntarily testified before the Congressional Committee on Government 
Reform less than a week after testifying at the Montgomery hearing to help in the effort to rid sports of 
doping. See Eradicating Steroid Use, Part IV: Examining the Use of Steroids by Young Women to 
Enhance Athletic Performance and Body Image: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov 't Reform, I 09th 
Cong. (2005) (testimony of Ms. Kelli White, former world champion sprinter), available at 
http://reform.house.gov/GovReform/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=28694 (follow ''Testimony of 
Ms. Kelli White" hyperlink). In relevant part White's testimony was: 
Id. 
In March of 2003, I made a choice that I will forever regret .... At that time, I began taking 
EPO, the clear (or THG), the cream and other stimulants. I remained on this program over 
the course of four months, and with the help of Mr. Conte, I was able to pass [seventeen] 
drug tests both in and out of competition while utilizing these prohibited performance 
enhancing substances. 
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her recounting ofa conversation she had had with Montgomery in March 2001 while 
at a track meet in Portugal. 95 According to White, Montgomery asked her, "[d]oes [the 
Clear] make your calves tight?" 96 After White had said yes, Montgomery, according 
to White, made a phone call to someone White believed was Mr. Conte to whom 
Montgomery relayed the information that White had said the Clear made her calves 
tight too. 97 According to White, she had no doubt in her mind that she and 
Montgomery were talking about a banned performance-enhancing drug.98 
The Tribunal's decision to rely so heavily on Ms. White's testimony was also 
influenced by Montgomery's decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment and not testify. 
The Tribunal determined that it was proper to "draw an adverse inference from Mr. 
Montgomery's refusal to testify" despite arguments by Montgomery that such an 
inference was not permitted. 99 The Tribunal reasoned: 
It might indeed have affected [our] appreciation of Ms. White's evidence had 
Respondent chosen to provide the Panel with a different explanation of their March 
2001 conversation or had he denied that the conversation took place as described by 
the witness. The fact remains that he did not .... He has had ample opportunity to 
deny ever making such statements. But because he has not offered any evidence of 
his own concerning his admission to Ms. White of his use of the Clear, the Panel can 
only rely on the testimony of Ms. White. That testimony is more than merely adverse 
to Mr. Montgomery; it is fatal to his case.100 
Ultimately, the Tribunal found Montgomery guilty of violating IAAF anti-doping 
rules 55.2(iii) and 60. l(iii). 101 As punishment, Montgomery was banned from 
competition for a period of two years commencing on June 6, 2005. 102 Also, the 
Tribunal stripped Montgomery of his on-track achievements dating back to March 
2001 and ordered him to repay an estimated $1 million in earnings. 103 Among the 




99. Id. at 19. Specifically, the Panel believed that it was entitled to draw an adverse inference in this 
instance because the "USADA ha[ d] presented evidence that would normally call for a Response from 
Respondent himself, and no[t] merely from his experts or counsel." Id. 
I 00. Id. at 19-20. Montgomery told Reuters after the decision had been rendered that he had never 
knowingly taken a banned substance. Montgomery Retires, supra note 8. Montgomery told Reuters that 
the CAS had misconstrued White's testimony and maintained that White had told the Panel that she had 
been the one to say "[the Clear] made me tight." Id. Montgomery's lawyer, Howard Jacobs, told the same 
version of events in the wake of the decision. Jacobs told the French news agency Agence France-Presse 
that the Tribunal "took what [White] said and contorted it to say [that] there was an admission. What she 
testified [to] was that she asked him if the [C]lear made his calves tight. White never testified that 'Tim 
told me the [C]lear made his calves tight."' Litsky, supra note 63. Since the transcript of the hearing and 
the briefs submitted by both sides are confidential, what actually transpired remains open to speculation. 
IO I. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 20. 
102. Id. at 21. 
103. Id. at 21-22. The panel estimated that March 31, 2001, was the date upon which Montgomery 
admitted his use of the Clear to White. Id. The$ I million lost earnings estimate was made by Svein Ame 
Hansen, the Director of the Golden League meet in Oslo, Norway. Montgomery Retires, supra note 8. 
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records expunged was Montgomery's world record run of9. 78 seconds set in the 100-
meter dash in 2002. 104 
In its conclusion, the Tribunal left little doubt that future CAS Panels would take 
the same approach to "non-analytical positive" cases by allowing a prosecuting agency, 
like the USADA, to meet its burden of proof in a variety of ways. 105 The Tribunal 
embraced the philosophy of the Italian National Olympic Committee, which in a 
declaration wrote, "it will be up to the adjudicating body having jurisdiction ... to 
determine cas·e by case whether the standard of proof of Article 3.1 of the W ADC has 
been met and the burden of proof has been discharged, or not, by the prosecuting 
sports authority." 106 
IV. UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY V. MONTGOMERY 
WAS WRONGLY DECIDED 
The CAS Tribunal's decision to declare Montgomery guilty of doping was 
incorrect because it prematurely ended his career, expunged his name from the record 
books, and ordered him to repay nearly $1 million in earnings without first granting 
him the due process appropriate to a quasi-criminal proceeding. The Tribunal made 
three critical errors en route to its unfortunate pronouncement. First, the Panel failed 
to announce the applicable standard of proof, determining that there was not a "great 
gulf between proof in civil and criminal matters." 107 Next, the Panel deemed it 
appropriate to convict Montgomery solely on evidence of his alleged confession. 108 
Finally, the Panel wrongly labeled the proceeding "civil" and determined that it was 
proper to draw an adverse inference from Montgomery's decision to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment and not testify. 109 
First, the Tribunal erred when it concluded that a prosecutor's evidentiary burden 
in a criminal case is not distinguishable from the evidentiary burden required of the 
parties in a civil case. This conclusion is highly problematic. How could the Tribunal 
say that there is no difference between a criminal and civil standard of proof? A 
criminal proceeding is altogether different in its makeup, placing the burden entirely 
on the prosecutor to present evidence to a degree that is far more certain than in a civil 
matter. The Panel's analysis is further flawed because Olympic doping proceedings 
do not even have a civil burden of proof, they have a quasi-criminal one that lies 
somewhere between the civil and criminal standards. 
I 04. Montgomery Retires, supra note 8. Montgomery retired at the age of 30 on December 14, 2005; 
the day after the Tribunal handed down its verdict. Id. Montgomery has made it clear he will not return 
the prize money saying, "I deserve every bit of it. ... IfI had tested positive, I would give every penny back . 
. . . But someone telling thein I told them somethin~ome on, this is not high school. They were playing 
games with my life." Athletics: Banned U.S. Sprinter Vows to Keep His Prize Money, INT'LHERALD TRIB., 
Dec. I 6, 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/16/sports/run.php. It remains to be seen 
whether the USAOA and the IAAF will try to enforce the judgment against Montgomery and go after his 
earnings in a subsequent proceeding. 
I 05. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 22. 
106. Id. 
101. Id. at 13. 
108. Id. at 17. 
109. Id. at 20. 
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Next, the Tribunal went wrong when it detennined that evidence ofMontgomery's 
alleged confession alone, conveyed through third party witness testimony, was 
sufficient evidence for the USADA to prove his guilt. The decision is entirely without 
precedent, and is wholly inconsistent with the reasoning set forth by the NAS Panel in 
Collins, where the USADA was required to present a myriad of corroborating evidence 
to meet its burden of proof in the first of its kind non-analytical positive case. 110 The 
Collins Panel wrote, "[n]one of this evidence by itself would be sufficient to find 
doping, but [as a whole] it is consistent with the charges [made by USADA]." 111 The 
Tribunal in Montgomery seemed to conveniently ignore this part of the decision in 
Collins when it reasoned that Montgomery's alleged confession was alone sufficient 
evidence to prove that he was guilty of doping. 112 
The Tribunal's determination would even appear to run counter to the W ADA's 
conception of how a CAS Olympic doping hearing should proceed. The WADA 
proclaimed that doping hearings should amount to more than a civil proceeding when 
it established a standard of proof in the W ADC that "is greater than a mere balance of 
probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 113 Such ·a burden of proof 
would seem to indicate that the WADA envisioned a hearing in a non-analytical 
positive case where strong corroborating evidence ofan athlete's guilt was required of 
an agency before that athlete was found to be a "doper." 
Finally, the Montgomery Tribunal blundered by drawing an adverse inference 
from Montgomery's decision not to testify, compounding the error made by the Collins 
Panel. The Collins Panel concluded that it was appropriate to draw an adverse 
inference in an Olympic doping proceeding, basing its decision primarily on the United 
States Supreme Court's holding in Baxter. 114 The Baxter Court, however, only allow-
ed an adverse inference to be drawn in a civil case, and explicitly established that one 
could not be drawn in a criminal case where a judge and prosecutor were not pennitted 
to suggest that the defendant's silence was tantamount to evidence of guilt. 115 By 
declaring it proper to draw an adverse inference in a quasi-criminal proceeding, the 
Collins Panel and the Montgomery Tribunal stretched the Baxter holding beyond its 
intended use. The Montgomery Tribunal justified its use of Baxter by characterizing 
0 lympic doping proceedings as civil throughout its opinion, but the stark truth combats 
this contention: Olympic doping proceedings before the CAS by any measure are not 
civil-they are quasi-criminal. Admittedly, there is no guideline for the procedural 
safeguards that should exist in quasi-criminal proceedings; however, there should be 
a distinct line drawn that separates them from civil proceedings. The drawing of an 
adverse inference should not be permitted in any hearing that exceeds the finnly 
established parameters of a civil proceeding. 
110. See U.S. Anti-DopingAgencyv. Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at25 (N. Am. Ct. of Arb. for 
Sport Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow 
"Former World Champion Collins Receives Eight-Year Suspension for Participation in BALCO Drug 
Conspiracy" hyperlink under "2004"). 
111. Id 
112. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 20. 
113. WADAANTI-DoPING CODE,supra note 14, at 12. 
114. Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at 14-15. 
115. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-19 ( 1976). 
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A different approach by the Montgomery Tribunal may well have concluded with 
a finding of guilt, while affording Montgomery a fair hearing with appropriate due 
process. The USADA presented evidence that the Tribunal did not even consider. 116 
A determination based upon the full body of evidence presented would have been a far 
wiser path to talce. Such a finding would have been consistent with the Collins Panel's 
correct determination that an agency must present a variety of substantiating evidence 
to prove an athlete's guilt in non-analytical positive cases. It would also have allowed 
the Tribunal to avoid its problematic conclusion that it was on firm footing to draw an 
adverse inference from Montgomery's decision not to testify. This alternate path 
would have allowed the Tribunal to establish a far better precedent for future non-
analytical positive cases. Instead, as things currently stand, an American athlete can 
have an adverse inference drawn from his or her decision not to testify, and be found 
guilty of doping solely on evidence of his or her alleged confession. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Tribunal presiding over Montgomery clearly struggled with the uncharted 
waters of a "non-analytical positive" case en route to its creation of a regrettable 
procedural blueprint. Future CAS Tribunals should contemplate the following 
suggestions as a way to rectify the outcome. First, CAS Tribunals should consider 
adopting a criminal burden of proof in non-analytical positive cases because evidence 
of an athlete's guilt in these matters is not straightforward as it is in doping cases that 
involve an analytical positive. Next, in keeping with this criminal standard, CAS 
Tribunals should follow the Collins model and require an agency like the USADA to 
present substantial varied evidence to prove an athlete's guilt in non-analytical positive 
cases. Finally, CAS Tribunals should stop referring to Olympic doping proceedings 
as "civil" and abandon the determination that it is proper to draw an adverse inference 
from an American athlete's decision not to testify. Baxter does not establish that an 
adverse inference can be drawn in a quasi-criminal proceeding; rather, it allows one 
to be drawn in a civil proceeding, and explicitly does not allow one to be drawn in a 
criminal one. The WADA has determined that Olympic doping hearings amount to 
more than a civil proceeding, and future CAS Tribunals need to recognize this and 
acknowledge that the Montgomery Tribunal and the Collins Panel erred by misusing 
the holding in Baxter. 
If future CAS Tribunals do not implement such changes, and instead stay the 
present course in non-analytical positive cases, the CAS will continue to be plagued 
by doubts and rumblings from athletes and their lawyers that it more closely resembles 
a "kangaroo court" than the impartial purveyor of jurisprudence it purports to be. 117 
The perception that athletes are not being given a fair day in court can only persist for 
so long before the current system that governs Olympic doping cases fails as an 
experiment. 
116. See Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 17. 
117. See, e.g., Straube!, supra note 42, at 1203. Marion Jones, a three-time gold medalist at the 2000 
Sydney Olympics (and former girlfriend of Tim Montgomery), referred to the CAS as a "kangaroo court" 













































Overview of Olympic Doping Adjudication 
Name Acronym Standard of Proof Comments 
Court of Arbitration CAS •Standard of Proof: •May draw adverse inference 
for Sport "Comfortable Satisfaction" that should Defendant not testify on 
the Quasi-Criminal standard own behalf. 
has been met. 
-Consider doping cases to be 
civil rather than criminal in 
nature. 
North American NAS •Standard of Proof: •NAS decisions are subject to 
Court of Arbitration "Comfortable Satisfaction" that CAS review. 
for Sport the Quasi-Criminal standard 
has been met. 
United States Anti- USADA •Standard of Proof: "Quasi- •Burden of proof greater than a 
Doping Agency Criminal" burden. mere balance of probability but 
less than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
World Anti-Doping WADA -Created the "Comfortable •Wrote World Anti-Doping 
Agency Satisfaction" standard of proof Code (W ADC) to create 
intheWADC. uniformity in doping cases; 
adopted by Olympic governing 
bodies. 
•Monitors compliance with the 
W ADC and facilitates anti-
doping efforts worldwide. 
•Declared doping cases to be 
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